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Abstract
We offer a search-theoretic model of statistical discrimination, in which firms treat identical
groups unequally based on their occupational choices. The model admits symmetric equilibria
in which the group characteristic is ignored, but also asymmetric equilibria in which a group
is statistically discriminated against, even when symmetric equilibria are unique. Moreover, a
robust possibility is that symmetric equilibria become unstable when the group characteristic
is introduced. Unlike most previous literature, our model can justify affirmative action since it
eliminates asymmetric equilibria without distorting incentives.
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1 Introduction
Statistical discrimination refers to situations in which some agents use observable characteristics
as a proxy for payoff relevant unobservable characteristics. The observable characteristics on which
statistical discrimination may be based include gender, race, job separation rate, unemployment
duration, job leave duration, or anything else that may serve as a proxy for unobservables that the
market cares about. Models of statistical discrimination were initially developed as an alternative
to taste-based models to explain group inequalities (see Fang and Moro (2011)). There are many
variants, but the main point with many of these models is that interactions between a signal
extraction problem and human capital investments can generate equilibria in which some group(s)
are worse off than others despite no fundamental differences between groups (see Arrow et al.
(1973), Coate and Loury (1993), and Moro and Norman (2004)).1
We consider statistical discrimination in a frictional search framework. This allows us to explore
an alternative channel in which self-fulfilling statistical discrimination can be sustained that is
complementary to the existing literature. Instead of investments in human capital, inequalities arise
in equilibrium due to search frictions and occupational choice. As demonstrated by Xiao (2020),
differences in occupational choice account for much of the gender wage gap, but it is accounted
for as reflecting preferences for amenities. This paper provides a complementary explanation, as it
shows that women may enter low paying occupations as a result of statistical discrimination.
Our baseline model without group characteristics is a discrete time random search model in
which there are two types of workers and two distinct technologies. We label the workers as qualified
or unqualified and the technologies as high tech and low tech. Conditional on an appropriate match,
a high tech firm is more productive than a low tech firm. However, only qualified workers are
productive at high tech firms, whereas the type of worker does not matter for low tech firms. This
type of technology has been considered before in the labor-search literature by Albrecht and Vroman
(2002), Gautier (2002), Dolado et al. (2009), and others. However, as far as we know, the only paper
that has combined a technology along these lines with asymmetric information about worker type
is Jarosch and Pilossoph (2019), but they have an equilibrium characterization very different from
ours.
When a high tech firm matches with a worker, they would like to hire the worker if and only
if the worker is qualified. Because the firm cannot directly observe the type of worker, this ideal
hiring rule can not be implemented. Instead, the firm observes a noisy signal that is correlated
with the type and may be interpreted as the result of a job interview. The signal is labeled so that
a higher signal is good news, which implies that an optimal hiring rule is one in which a worker is
offered a job if and only if the signal exceeds some threshold.
Importantly, the optimal hiring threshold depends not only on parameters of the noisy signal
but also on the prior probability that a worker is qualified. Since we consider random matching, this
prior probability is simply the proportion of qualified workers in the pool of unemployed, which is
1The first paper along these lines is Arrow et al. (1973). See also Coate and Loury (1993), Moro and Norman
(2004), and the survey by Fang and Moro (2011).
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endogenous. Hence, while search externalities along the lines of many existing papers are present in
our model, there are now also informational externalities that are novel to the search and matching
literature.
If the probability that a qualified worker accepts a low tech position increases, then the outflow
of qualified workers from the pool of unemployed increases. In steady state, this reduces the
proportion of qualified workers in the pool of unemployed, which increases the hiring threshold.
Hence, a steady state increase in the probability that a qualified worker accepts a low tech job
makes it harder to obtain a high tech job. With free entry, this also affects entry decisions and the
details of how that works are somewhat intricate and also depend on whether workers are following
a pure or mixed acceptance rule. The main point, however, is that there is feedback from the
worker acceptance rule in the low tech sector to the optimal hiring threshold for high tech firms.
The baseline model may have a unique equilibrium, or there may be multiple equilibria. How-
ever, it is important to note that nothing in our analysis with multiple groups rests on multiplicity
in the single group model. We introduce a payoff irrelevant observable characteristic by assuming
that a worker either is from group m or group f , which can be observed by the firms. The two
groups are identical in the sense that the proportion of qualified workers is the same for both groups,
but we allow the groups to be of different sizes. We demonstrate that the existence of asymmetric
equilibria is a robust possibility, whether or not the baseline model has a unique equilibrium.
If everyone ignores the observable characteristic, the equilibrium conditions in the case with
multiple groups are the same as in the baseline model, so there is always at least one equilibrium
with equal treatment of the workers. However, these symmetric equilibria may be very fragile in
the case of multiple groups. One possible symmetric equilibrium is when both sectors are active,
and qualified workers randomize between accepting low tech jobs. In such an equilibrium, firms
are indifferent between entering as a high tech and as a low tech firm, and the proportion of high
tech firms is determined so that qualified workers are indifferent between accepting and rejecting
low tech job offers. Imagine that the proportion of qualified m workers increases ever so slightly
while the proportion of qualified f workers is held fix. Assuming no change in the fraction of high
tech jobs, this would make the best response for m workers to reject low tech jobs for sure. In the
full equilibrium, the proportion of high tech job will in general change, but this does not change
the argument much. Either m workers have to reject low tech jobs for sure or f workers have to
accept low tech jobs for sure after the change. Therefore, an arbitrarily small exogenous change in
the proportion of qualified men creates a significant difference through the equilibrium conditions.
Hence, symmetric equilibria of the form just described can not be stable.
A related point is that there is a true interaction between groups. Unlike models like Coate and Loury
(1993), in which discrimination is interpreted as one group coordinating on a good equilibrium and
another on a bad one, incentives for one group are affected by the behavior of the other. This
non-separability allows asymmetric equilibria to exist even if the baseline model has a unique equi-
librium.
Most existing models of statistical discrimination focuses on the interplay between incentives
for human capital investments and hiring decisions. A group is discriminated in the labor market
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because, in equilibrium, the group is less skilled on average. In our frictional model of the labor
market, the average skill level in the pool of unemployed is not the same as the skill level in the
population, so we are able to explain statistical discrimination between groups that in equilibrium
are equally skilled.
The standard model explains the lower skill level as the consequence of having less high powered
incentives to invest in skills. It has been argued that there is very little empirical evidence for
this. In fact, in the case of the black-white wage gap, Neal and Johnson (1996) and Neal (2006)
argue that blacks have stronger incentives to acquire skills than whites, which is inconsistent with
standard models of statistical discrimination.2 In our model, skills are exogenous, but statistical
discrimination is still a possibility. Instead of feeding into incentives for skill acquisition, the labor
market responses feed into incentives to accept dead-end jobs. So, in a sense, the decision to turn
down bad jobs in our model plays a similar role as skill investments in the standard model, and
there are similar free-riding considerations involved as individuals benefit from the total number of
people within the group that turn low tech jobs down.
Another issue with standard models of statistical discrimination is that, in equilibrium, the
discriminated group is, on average, less productive than the dominant group. This is possible
despite there being no intrinsic differences between groups, but a theory that implies that women
are significantly less productive than men because of the lack of human capital investments may
not be the most plausible. After all, women are now acquiring more education than men. While
education is not the kind of unobservable investments that are considered in models of statistical
discrimination, we find our alternative explanation quite plausible. There is also rather convincing
evidence of various forms of mismatch between worker skills and jobs (for example, see Clark et al.
(2017) and the references therein on worker over-education) suggesting that it seems reasonable to
have mismatch also with respect to unobservable skills.
Affirmative action policies can be counterproductive in many conventional models of statistical
discrimination. In Coate and Loury (1993), the problem is that preferential treatment may reduce
the incentives to acquire skills. This may also be true in Moro and Norman (2003), where, addi-
tionally, the targeted group may be may worse off, and such perverse welfare effects are even more
prevalent in Fang and Norman (2006). In contrast, a hiring quota requiring firms to hire workers
in accordance with population proportions in this model eliminates all asymmetric equilibria. This
is because firms must have lower standards for women if there are fewer qualified women in the
pool of unemployed. This unambiguously makes qualified women having a better chance than men
at high tech jobs, which moves incentives in the desired direction. In contrast, in the previous
literature, the hiring quota may create disincentives to invest in human capital.
We make many simplifying assumptions in order to make our analysis as transparent as possible.
Most notably, we assume that wages are exogenous. While this is obviously unrealistic, we see no
reason why endogenizing wages through posting or bargaining would qualitatively change anything.
Our model is not the first dynamic model of statistical discrimination. However, existing dy-
2However, Glover et al. (2017) provides some evidence in favor of models of statistical discrimination.
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namic models are very different from our setup. An early contribution is Mailath et al. (2000), in
which firms can direct their search towards specific groups, creating discriminatory equilibria. In
Jarosch and Pilossoph (2019) some elements are similar, but they have a unique equilibrium and
consider “statistical discrimination” with respect to unemployment duration, which is a proxy for
skills because a long unemployment spell signals that the worker has been rejected by many firms.
In Kim and Loury (2018) it is shown that, depending on parameters, it may or may not be possible
to escape an undesirable equilibrium by re-coordinating beliefs in a stylized overlapping genera-
tions version of Coate and Loury (1993). In Bohren et al. (2019) beliefs evolve in equilibrium, but
the underlying source of discrimination is irrational biased beliefs. Our model does not need such
exogenous bias. Finally, Che et al. (2019) consider a model of ratings-guided markets which is very
different from ours in terms of modelling details, but in which similar externalities arise. Like in
our model, discriminatory equilibria may also arise in the case in which there is a unique symmetric
equilibrium.3
2 The Baseline Model
We consider a labor market where a unit mass of workers and a continuum of firms are matched
randomly. Workers and firms are infinitely lived, forward-looking, risk-neutral, and have a common
discount factor of β. Time is discrete, and we focus on steady state equilibria.
Later on, we will add observable payoff irrelevant group characteristics that can be interpreted
as race or gender, but to minimize notation we begin by introducing a benchmark model with
no group characteristics. This baseline model also provides a full characterization of symmetric
equilibria in the model with observable group characteristics.
A proportion ψ of the workers are qualified , and the remaining fraction 1 − ψ are referred to
as unqualified. Qualified workers are equipped with a skill that matters for some firms, but not for
others. Specifically, we assume that a firm can be one of two types. Some firms, referred to as low
tech firms, produce flow output yl and pays exogenous wage wl when matched with a worker of
either type. We assume that yl − wl > 0 implying that low tech firms are willing to employ any
worker it matches with.
Other firms face a non-trivial decision when matched with a worker. If a high tech firm is
matched with a qualified worker the match produces flow output yh and the firm pays the exogenous
wage wh, where yh − wh > 0. The firm would thus want to hire the worker if the worker is known
to be qualified. In contrast, if the worker is unqualified the flow output is (normalized to) zero,
so the flow profit is −wh, so a high tech firm would never want to hire an unqualified worker. We
assume that wl < wh, implying that high tech matches are more desirable than low tech matches
for the worker. The flow value of unemployment is b < wl.
The firm cannot directly observe whether a worker is qualified or not. Instead, the firm observes
a noisy signal θ ∈ [0, 1], which is drawn from density fq(θ) if the worker is qualified and from fu(θ)
3 See also Antonovics (2006), Eeckhout (2006), Glawtschew (2015), and Masters (2014)
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otherwise. Since the signal θ is pure information, there is no loss of generality to label the signal
realizations so that higher realizations correspond with a higher probability of the worker being
qualified, so we assume that the likelihood ratio
fq(θ)
fu(θ)
is strictly increasing in θ.4
Let pi be the firm’s prior probability that a worker is qualified. Using the monotone likelihood
ratio property, it is immediate that the posterior probability after observing θ
P (θ, pi) =
pifq (θ)
pifq (θ) + (1− pi) fu (θ)
, (1)
is also monotone in θ,, which makes it very easy to describe optimal hiring rules.
If a match forms we also assume that the qualification of the worker is revealed to the corre-
sponding matched firm in every period with some probability r. Should a worker in a high skilled
firm be revealed to have low productivity, that worker is fired. There is also an exogenous separation
probability φ, which is ensuring that steady state conditions behave nicely.
We parametrize the model so that the unqualified workers’ acceptance rules are trivial: unqual-
ified workers accept any job offer they get. In contrast, a qualified worker will always accept a high
tech offer as b < wl < wh, but may or may not accept low tech jobs depending on, for example,
how likely it is to match with a high tech firm in the future. This is the only non-trivial worker
choice in the model, and we let α ∈ [0, 1] denote the endogenous probability that a qualified worker
accepts when offered a position at a low tech firm.
There is free entry into both the high and the low tech sectors, and the flow cost of a vacancy is
K > 0 in either sector. For simplicity we assume a matching protocol in which the short side gets
served and the long side is rationed. Because entry is on the firm side only we never need to worry
that there are more workers than firms if the entry cost is set so that there is a strict incentive
to enter if the firm matches for sure. Hence, workers will match for sure in each period, but the
probability of matching with high tech or low tech firms is endogenously determined by firm entry
as the ratio of workers to firms.
To sum up, the only non-trivial choice variables in the model are:
(1) The probability α ∈ [0, 1] for a qualified worker to accept low tech jobs.
(2) Entry decisions by firms in both sectors.
(3) Given the noisy signal θ ∈ [0, 1], whether a high tech firm should offer a job to the worker in
a match.
We will focus solely on steady state equilibria.
4Assuming that the likelihood ratio is strictly increasing and assuming away mass points at the same time is not
completely without loss. We make the assumption to assure a unique solution for the firm optimal hiring strategy.
Weakening to weak monotonicity allows for signals replicating discrete support. This is less elegant, but can be dealt
with.
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3 Equilibria in the Baseline Model
3.1 Firms’ Problem
We begin by considering the hiring decision for a high-tech firm. Let pi ∈ [0, 1] be the endogenous
stationary proportion of qualified workers in the pool of unemployed, which is also the prior proba-
bility that the worker is qualified from the point of view of the firm. Also, letW (0, pi) ,W (u, pi) and
W (q, pi) be the value of a vacancy, being matched with an unqualified worker, and being matched
with a qualified worker respectively, as a function of pi. The firm values of hiring an unqualified
and qualified worker are
W (u, pi) = −wh + β [(φ+ (1− φ) r)W (0, pi) + (1− φ) (1− r)W (u, pi)] (2)
W (q, pi) = yh − wh + β [φW (0, pi) + (1− φ)W (q, pi)] .
For the unqualified worker, the probability of moving from employment at a high tech firm to
unemployment is higher than for the qualified worker. This is because the type may be revealed in
addition to the common separation rate. Solving for these values in terms of the value of a vacancy
and using the free entry condition W (0, pi) = 0, we can express these values purely in terms of the
exogenous parameters as
W (u, pi) =
−wh
1− β (1− φ) (1− r)
≡Wu < 0 (3)
W (q, pi) =
yh − wh
1− β (1− φ)
≡Wq > 0.
Now, assume that a firm has matched with a worker and that the noisy signal θ ∈ [0, 1] has been
drawn. If the worker is hired, the expected continuation payoff is Wq if the worker is qualified and
Wu if the worker is not. In contrast, if the worker is not hired, the firm moves on to the next period
with a vacancy, which has value 0. Hence, the firm is better off hiring the worker in expectation if
and only if
P (θ, pi)Wq + (1− P (θ, pi))Wu ≥ 0, (4)
where P (θ, pi) is defined in (1). Since P (θ, pi) is strictly increasing in θ for any pi ∈ [0, 1] we have
that:
Lemma 1. For any given pi ∈ [0, 1] the unique optimal hiring rule is a threshold rule where a worker
is offered a job if and only θ ≥ s (pi) . If
pifq(0)
(1−pi)fu(0)
≥ −Wu
Wq
then s (pi) = 0 and
pifq(1)
(1−pi)fu(1)
≤ −Wu
Wq
then s (1) = 0. If
pifq(0)
(1−pi)fu(0)
< −Wu
Wq
<
pifq(1)
(1−pi)fu(1)
the threshold s (pi) ∈ (0, 1) satisfies
pifq (s (pi))
(1− pi) fu (s (pi))
= −
Wu
Wq
. (5)
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Notice that one can also understand the threshold s (pi) as the solution to
max
θ
pi [1− Fq(θ)]Wq + (1− pi) [1− Fu(θ)]Wu. (6)
The interpretation of this problem is as the ex ante expected profit from a threshold rule. This is
because pi is the probability that a worker is qualified and 1− Fq (θ) is the conditional probability
that the signal is above θ, so pi (1− Fq (θ)) is the probability of hiring a qualified worker if the
hiring threshold is θ. Symmetrically, (1− pi) (1− Fu (θ)) is the probability of hiring an unqualified
worker if the hiring threshold is θ, so the objective function in (6) is the profit as a function of the
hiring threshold. The condition (5) can be obtained from the first order condition for the problem
(6).
For a low tech firm, it always offers a job to any worker following a match. The continuation
payoff from hiring is
Wl =
yl − wl
1− β(1− φ)
> 0, (7)
using the free entry condition as for high tech firms.
3.2 Equilibrium Entry
For notational simplicity let
Aq (pi) = 1− Fq (s (pi)) (8)
Au (pi) = 1− Fu (s (pi))
be the unique probabilities that qualified and unqualified workers are hired when matched with
a high tech firm in an equilibrium in which the proportion of qualified workers in the pool of
unemployed in pi. It should be intuitively clear that these probabilities will affect the incentives for
qualified workers. We therefore write α (pi) for the probability that a qualified worker accepts a
low tech job explicitly as a function of pi despite not yet having discussed the worker optimization
problem. The free entry conditions for high each and low tech sectors are then
0 = −K + βpf [piAq(pi)Wq + (1− pi)Au(pi)Wu] (9)
0 = −K + βpf [piα (pi) + (1− pi)]Wl,
where pf is the probability that a firm matches with a worker, which is equal to the ratio of
unemployment over vacancies, or the inverse market tightness rate. Note that
Lemma 2. The profit of entering high tech sector, piAq(pi)Wq + (1 − pi)Au(pi)Wu, is strictly in-
creasing in pi.
The intuitive idea is that the profit is strictly increasing in pi for any fixed hiring threshold, and
adjusting the threshold only increases the gain. The proof is in the appendix. It follows that pf
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is strictly decreasing in pi, given that the high tech sector is active. Hence, total entry is strictly
increasing in pi, except in the uninteresting case in which no high tech firms enter.
However, a condition that will prove more useful for the equilibrium characterization is that
(9) implies that when both sectors are active, firms must be indifferent between entering as high
or low tech firms, or
[piα (pi) + (1− pi)]Wl = piAq(pi)Wq + (1− pi)Au(pi)Wu. (10)
Notice that the assumption that K is equal for the two sectors is just a normalization, as differences
in costs of maintaining a vacancy can be incorporated in Wl. Next, consider the possibility that
qualified workers always reject low tech wage offers. In order for both sectors to be active in this
case, it must be that the proportion of qualified workers among the unemployed is pi, which we
define as the unique solution to
(1− pi)Wl = piAq(pi)Wq + (1− pi)Au(pi)Wu, (11)
The expected profit of being in the low tech sector decreases in pi and the expected profit of being
in the high tech sector increases in pi, so if pi < pi then only low tech firms would be willing to enter.
Symmetrically, if qualified workers always accept low tech jobs the proportion of qualified workers
that ensure indifference, pi, is
Wl = piAq(pi)Wq + (1− pi)Au(pi)Wu. (12)
Hence, if pi > pi the expected payoff of being a high tech firm is higher than being a low tech
firm even if qualified workers always accept low tech offers. Summing this up we have that:
Lemma 3. Suppose that K is small enough so that there are firms that want to enter. Then
(1) If pi < pi then firms will enter the low tech sector only regardless of what workers do.
(2) If pi = pi then firms are willing to enter in each sector if and only if α (pi) = 0. If α (pi) > 0
firms are willing to enter the low tech sector only.
(3) If pi < pi < pi there is a unique α (pi) ∈ (0, 1) such that firms are willing to enter in each
sector. For α > α (pi) ∈ (0, 1) only low tech firms are willing to enter and if α < α (pi) ∈ (0, 1)
only high tech firms are willing to enter.
(4) If pi = pi firms are willing to enter in each sector if and only if α (pi) = 1. If α (pi) < 1 only
high tech firms are willing to enter.
(5) If pi > pi firms will enter the high tech sector only regardless of what workers do.
The firms’ optimality is summarized into the following Figure 1. The details of the proof are in
Appendix A.3.
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Low tech Two sectors High-tech
Figure 1: Firm Entry as Function of Beliefs.
3.3 Workers’ Optimization
Since we have trivialized the unqualified workers into agents who always accept every offer, we only
need to consider the qualified workers. Denote by V0 (pi), Vh (pi) and Vl (pi) the value for a qualified
worker from being unemployed, being employed in the high tech sector, and being employed in the
low tech sector, respectively. Also, let p (pi) be the endogenous probability that the worker meets a
high tech firm, so that 1−p (pi) is the probability of meeting a low tech firm. We use the convention
that V0 (pi) is the value of unemployment immediately prior to matching with the firm, so that
V0 (pi) = p (pi) [Aq (pi)Vh (pi) + (1−Aq (pi)) (b+ V0 (pi))] (13)
+ (1− p (pi)) max
α∈[0,1]
[αVl (pi) + (1− α) [b+ βV0 (pi)]] ,
where we can write the values of being employed in terms of exogenous parameters and the value
of unemployment as
Vh (pi) =
wh + φβV0 (pi)
1− (1− φ) β
(14)
Vl (pi) =
wl + φβV0 (pi)
1− (1− φ) β
.
Hence, letting α (pi) be the solution to the optimization problem in (13). Then,
α (pi) =

1 if wl+φβV0(pi)1−(1−φ)β > b+ βV0 (pi)
[0, 1] if wl+φβV0(pi)1−(1−φ)β = b+ βV0 (pi)
0 if wl+φβV0(pi)1−(1−φ)β < b+ βV0 (pi)
. (15)
Let V ∗ be the value of unemployment that makes the worker indifferent between accepting and
rejecting, that is
wl + φβV
∗
1− (1− φ) β
= b+ βV ∗. (16)
Then, since the value of working in the low tech sector increases in the value of unemployment at
a rate strictly slower than β we can express (15) as
α (pi) =

1 if V0 (pi) < V
∗
[0, 1] if V0 (pi) = V
∗
0 if V0 (pi) > V
∗
. (17)
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Combining with (13) we have that for the worker to be indifferent it must be that
V ∗ = p (pi)Aq (pi)
wh + φβV
∗
1− (1− φ) β
+ (1−Aq (pi) p (pi)) (b+ βV
∗) .
Let p (pi)Aq (pi) = Q (pi) be the probability of meeting a high-tech firm and being hired for a
qualified worker, we have
V ∗ = Q (pi)
wh + φβV
∗
1− (1− φ) β
+ (1−Q (pi)) (b+ βV ∗) . (18)
Hence, the probability for a qualified worker to be hired by a high tech firm that makes the
worker indifferent between accepting and rejecting low tech jobs can be determined independently
from pi. We thus get the following simple characterization of the worker acceptance rule.
Lemma 4. Suppose that 0 ≤ wl − b ≤ β(1 − φ)(wh − b). Then there exists a unique constant
Q∗ ∈ [0, 1] such that
V ∗ = Q∗
wh + φβV
∗
1− (1− φ) β
+ (1−Q∗) (b+ βV ∗) , (19)
where V ∗ is defined in (16). Moreover,
α (pi) =

1 if p(pi)Aq(pi) < Q
∗
[0, 1] if p(pi)Aq(pi) = Q
∗
0 if p(pi)Aq(pi) > Q
∗
. (20)
The proof can be found in the appendix. The parameter restrictions are to avoid corner cases,
which in terms of the statement of the Lemma would show up as Q∗ being negative or larger than
one. First, if wl < b, then workers prefer unemployment to working in the low tech sector, so the
low tech sector would always be inactive. Secondly, if wl − b > β(1− φ)(wh − b) one can show that
low tech jobs are always accepted even if p (pi)Aq (pi) = 1.
3.4 Steady State Conditions
Let N be the total mass of unemployed workers, and Npi be the mass of qualified workers in the
unemployed workers, N (1− pi) be the mass of unqualified worker in the unemployed workers. Let
Ek,s be the mass of workers with skill k ∈ {q, u} employed in sector s ∈ {h, l}. We can then write
the steady state conditions equalizing the outflow and inflow of each pool of qualified-high tech,
qualified-low tech, unqualified-high tech, unqualified-low tech as
Npip(pi)Aq(pi) = Eq,hφ (21)
Npi(1− p(pi))α(pi) = Eq,lφ
N (1− pi) p(pi)Au(pi) = Eu,h(φ+ (1− φ)r)
N (1− pi) (1− p(pi)) = Eu,lφ.
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Moreover, for each type, the total mass of workers must add up to the mass employed in each
sector together with those in unemployment.
Npi + Eq,h + Eq,l = ψ (22)
N(1− pi) + Eu,h + Eu,l = 1− ψ.
By substituting from Equations (21) into Equation (22) we obtain
Npi +
Npip(pi)Aq(pi)
φ
+
Npi(1− p(pi))α(pi)
φ
= ψ (23)
N(1− pi) +
N(1− pi)p(pi)Au(pi)
φ+ (1− φ)r
+
N(1− pi)(1− p(pi))
φ
= 1− ψ.
Finally, by eliminating N we can summarize the steady state condition in a single equation
1 +
p(pi)Au(pi)
φ+ (1− φ)r
+
1− p(pi)
φ
=
1− ψ
1− pi
pi
ψ
[
1 +
p(pi)Aq(pi)
φ
+
(1− p(pi))α(pi)
φ
]
. (24)
Equation (24) represents the steady state conditions for the labor market, given qualified worker’s
acceptance rule α(pi) and high-tech firms’ hiring strategy Aq(pi) and Au(pi).
For the analysis that follows it is useful to define real function G : [0, 1]3 → R,
G (pi, α, p) = 1 +
pAu(pi)
φ+ (1− φ)r
+
1− p
φ
−
1− ψ
1− pi
pi
ψ
[
1 +
pAq(pi)
φ
+
(1− p)α
φ
]
. (25)
Using this notation, we can define an equilibrium compactly as:
Definition 1. An equilibrium is a triple (pi, α (pi) , p (pi)) such that i) α (pi) satisfies worker opti-
mality condition (20), and p (pi) is consistent with optimal entry and; ii) G (pi, α(pi), p(pi)) = 0.
There is also a choice of an optimal hiring threshold s(pi), but this is built into the terms Aq(pi)
and Au(pi) in the steady state conditions. Also note that if 0 < α (pi) < 1, then both sectors must
be active implying that any p (pi) ∈ [0, 1] is a best response. In this case p (pi) are thus set to make
the workers indifferent. Finally, note that the total mass of firms entering is also an equilibrium
object in principle. However, the matching technology is such that workers match with exactly one
firm in every period, so this does not interact with any other variable and can be left implicit in
the analysis.
4 Equilibrium Characterization
While the steady state equation (24), firm entry, and worker optimality conditions are all rather
straightforward, the equilibrating mechanism is different in different ranges. For convenience, we
have summarized the various cases in the figure below.
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Figure 2: Equilibrium Candidates.
4.1 Equilibria with One Sector Active
Depending on parameters, an equilibrium can have only low tech firms active, only high tech jobs
active, or both sectors active. The necessary and sufficient conditions for a low tech equilibrium
are straightforward and easy to understand:
Proposition 1. An equilibrium in which only low tech firms are active exists if and only if ψ ≤ pi.
This is the unique equilibrium if ψ < pi.
The intuition is simple. In a low tech equilibrium, workers become homogenous, so there is
no longer any selection. Therefore pi = ψ in steady state. Recalling that pi defined in (12) is the
critical value for pi that makes firms indifferent between the two sectors when all qualified workers
accept low tech jobs, we note that for pi ≤ pi firms are more profitable in the low tech sector than
in the high tech sector if all workers accept low tech jobs. Moreover, workers have a strict incentive
to accept low tech jobs since the probability of a high tech offer is zero. The fact that no other
equilibrium can exist when pi follows directly from the definition of (11).
The conditions for existence of equilibria with only the high tech sector active are a bit more
involved for two reasons. Firstly, there will be negative selection effects in such an equilibrium.
Secondly, the worker optimality condition is now non-trival. We now consider the steady state
condition if only high tech firms enter. Since there are no low tech firms around, the determination
of pi in such an equilibrium is independent of α (pi) and simplifies to
G˜ (pi) = G (pi, α (pi) , 1) = 1 +
Au(pi)
φ+ (1− φ)r
−
1− ψ
1− pi
pi
ψ
[
1 +
Aq(pi)
φ
]
= 0. (26)
Note that Au(pi)
φ+(1−φ)r <
Aq(pi)
φ
for any pi, which reflects that this type of an equilibrium generates
negative selection as qualified workers are more likely to move from unemployment to employment
and less likely to move from employment to unemployment.
However, while α (pi) is irrelevant for the steady state condition we still have to ask what a
worker would do if counter factually matching with a low tech firm. That is, if a worker would
accept an offer from a deviating low tech entrant and if pi is strictly in between pi and pi, then this
is inconsistent with a high tech equilibrium. It thus follows:
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Proposition 2. There is at least one solution pi∗ to (26), and;
1. Suppose pi∗ < pi solves (26). Then there is no high tech equilibrium corresponding to pi∗.
2. Suppose pi∗ ∈ [pi, pi] solves (26) and Aq (pi
∗) < Q∗. Then there is no high tech equilibrium
corresponding to pi∗.
3. Suppose pi∗ ∈ [pi, pi] solves (26) and Aq (pi
∗) ≥ Q∗. Then (pi∗, α (pi∗) = 0, p (pi∗) = 1) is an
equilibrium.
4. Suppose pi∗ > pi solves (26). Then (pi∗, α(pi∗) = 1, p (pi∗) = 1) is an equilibrium.
One may note that pi∗ < ψ for any solution to (26), because if pi∗ solves (26) then
1 >
1 + Au(pi
∗)
φ+(1−φ)r
1 +
Aq(pi∗)
φ
=
1− ψ
1− pi∗
pi∗
ψ
, (27)
as Au(pi
∗)
φ+(1−φ)r <
Aq(pi∗)
φ
for any pi∗,. Hence, being unemployed is correlated with being unqualified with
being unqualified in an equilibrium with only the high tech sector active. Moreover,
Aq(pi∗)
φ
→ ∞
as φ → 0 while 1 + Au(pi)
φ+(1−φ)r stays finite provided that r > 0. Hence, pi
∗ → 0 for any sequence of
solutions to (26) as φ→ 0 implying that there exists φ∗ > 0 such that pi∗ < pi for any φ ≤ φ∗ and
any solution to (26). We conclude:
Corollary 1. There exists φ∗ > 0 such that no equilibrium in which only high tech firms enter can
exist if φ ≤ φ∗.
4.2 Equilibria with Both Sectors Active
Having discussed the conditions with the less interesting single sector equilibria, we now consider
equilibria in which both sectors are active. Such equilibria may take on different forms in different
parts of the parameter space. There are three distinct possibilities:
1. All workers accept low tech jobs. This requires that pi = pi. Additionally, it must be that
p (pi)Aq (pi) ≤ Q
∗ to justify the decisions of the workers.
2. All workers reject low tech jobs. This requires that pi = pi. Additionally, it must be that
p (pi)Aq (pi) ≥ Q
∗ to justify the decisions of the workers.
3. Workers are indifferent and randomize in a way so that firms are indifferent between the two
sectors.
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4.2.1 Low Tech Jobs Accepted
First, consider the possibility that α (pi) = 1, which implies that pi = p¯i to ensure firms’ indifference.
To be consistent with the steady state condition (24) it must be that p (pi) is such that
G (pi, 1, p (pi)) = 1 +
p (pi)Au(pi)
φ+ (1− φ)r
+
1− p (pi)
φ
−
1− ψ
1− pi
pi
ψ
[
1 +
p (pi)Aq(pi)
φ
+
(1− p (pi))
φ
]
= 0, (28)
holds and p (pi)Aq (pi) ≤ Q
∗. In the appendix we show that this is consistent with equilibrium under
the following conditions.
Proposition 3. A two sector equilibrium with workers accepting low tech jobs exists if and only if
the following conditions hold:
1. ψ > pi
2. G (pi, 1, 1) ≤ 0
3. p (pi)Aq (pi) ≤ Q
∗ for the solution to (28).
There can be at most one such equilibrium.
Notice that the equilibrating variable that balances the steady state condition is no longer pi
for these types of equilibrium. Instead, the steady state is achieved by finding the right mix of
low tech and high tech firms. Also note that in this type of equilibrium, the probability of being
qualified must be lower for unemployed workers than in the population as a whole, explaining the
first condition. Finally, the steady state condition (3) is linear in the proportion of high tech firms,
explaining why there can be at most one equilibrium in this form.
4.2.2 Low Tech Jobs Rejected
Suppose first that both sectors are active and all qualified workers reject low tech jobs. Then pi = pi
and α (pi) = 0. We then seek solutions p (pi) to the steady state equilibrium condition (24) that is
consistent with qualified workers rejecting low tech jobs. This is true if and only if
G (pi, 0, p (pi)) = 1 +
p (pi)Au(pi)
φ+ (1− φ)r
+
1− p (pi)
φ
−
1− ψ
1− pi
pi
ψ
[
1 +
p (pi)Aq(pi)
φ
]
= 0 (29)
p(pi)Aq(pi) ≥ Q
∗.
As G (pi, 0, p) is linear in p, and strictly decreasing in p since
Au(pi)
φ+ (1− φ)r
−
1
φ
−
1− ψ
1− pi
pi
ψ
Aq(pi)
φ
< 0.
It follows that:
Proposition 4. A two sector equilibrium with workers rejecting low tech jobs exists if and only if
the following conditions hold:
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1. G (pi, 0, 0) > 0
2. G (pi, 0, 1) < 0
3. p (pi)Aq (pi) ≥ Q
∗ for the solution to (29).
There can be at most one such equilibrium.
Again, the proportion of high tech firms is the equilibrating variable, and, again, the steady
state condition is linear in this proportion. Assuming that ψ ≥ pi we have that
G (pi, 0, 0) = 1 +
1
φ
−
1− ψ
1− pi
pi
ψ
≥
1
φ
, (30)
so a sufficient condition for G (pi, 0, 0) > 0 is that ψ ≥ pi. It is also the case that for any ψ and pi there
exists φ sufficiently small for G (pi, 0, 0) > 0. A small enough φ also ensures that G (pi, 0, 1) < 0.
4.2.3 Workers Mixing
Finally, we consider the possibility of an equilibrium in which both sectors are active and pi < pi < pi,
which requires indifference on behalf of the workers. For indifference at some pi ∈ (pi, pi) it is
necessary that
p (pi) =
Q∗
Aq (pi)
∈ [0, 1] . (31)
Moreover, provided that pi ≤ pi ≤ pi there is a unique α (pi) ∈ [0, 1] that makes firms indifferent
across sectors, α (·) is strictly increasing, continuous and satisfies α (pi) = 0 and α (pi) = 1. Hence,
we seek a solution so pi∗ ∈ (pi, pi) to
G
(
pi∗, α (pi∗) ,
Q∗
Aq (pi∗)
)
= 0. (32)
Equilibria in which both firms and workers randomize may co-exist with other types of equilibria.
However, we next establish that there is always at least one steady state equilibrium of the model.
Proposition 5. There is always at least one equilibrium.
The proof is in the appendix.
5 Numerical Examples
To illustrate various possibilities, we now consider a pair of numerical examples. We set fq(θ) = 2θ,
fu(θ) = 2(1− θ), which is not only consistent with the monotone likelihood rate property, but also
guarantees interior hiring thresholds as the likelihood ratio is 0 at θ = 0 and approaches infinity as
θ converges to one. We also assume that wh, yh, β, φ, and r are set so that Wq = 1 and Wu = −1
in each example. Solving for the optimal hiring threshold in (5) we obtain s(pi) = 1− pi. Plugging
this threshold into Fq(θ) = θ
2 and Fu(θ) = 2θ − θ
2 and using the definitions in (8) we obtain
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Aq(pi) = pi(2 − pi) and Au(pi) = pi
2, respectively. All our numerical examples use these signals and
firm values.
The purpose of the examples is to illustrate the difference between the model with and without
group characteristics. In this section, in which have yet to introduce the group characteristic, we
show that we may have unique of multiple equilibria. However, the example in which the equilibrium
is unique is the exact same parametrization as the numerical example with multiple groups. With
multiple groups, asymmetric discriminatory equilibria appear, demonstrating how discrimination
in this model is driven by spillover effects between groups as opposed to pure coordination.
5.1 Example 1: Unique Equilibrium
Figure 3 plots the relevant steady state equation as a function of pi for the three ranges in which
pi is the variable that adjusts to support the steady state. For pi < pi we know that the only
candidate solution is a low tech equilibrium with pi = ψ, but we nevertheless plot G(pi, 1, 0) for
completeness (the formula is in (47)). For pi ∈ (pi, pi), the equilibrium pi is pinned down by the
steady state equation (32), and for pi ∈ (pi, 1], the equilibrium pi is pinned down by the steady state
equation (26). From Figure 3 we see that there is neither a mixed, nor a high tech nor a low tech
equilibrium.
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Figure 3: The bounds pi = 0.1647 and pi = 0.1802. Parameters used for this example are: β =
0.9, φ = 0.06, r = 0.75, ψ = 0.25, b = 0.2; and Wq = 1, Wu = −1, yl = 0.5, wl = 0.495.
What cannot be seen from Figure 3 is whether there is an equilibrium at pi = pi or pi = pi. Solving
for the unique p(pi) ∈ [0, 1] that is consistent with steady state in the left side of Figure 4, we find
that under the parameter of the example p(pi)Aq(pi)−Q
∗ = 0.8707×0.1647×(2−0.1647)−0.1830 > 0,
so rejecting low tech offers is consistent with worker optimality. However, at pi = pi, the steady
state value p(pi) ∈ [0, 1] shown in the right side of Figure 4 is not consistent with workers’ accepting
low tech offers as p(pi)Aq(pi)−Q
∗ = 0.6514 × 0.1802 × (2− 0.1802) − 0.1830 > 0. Hence there is a
unique equilibrium in this example.
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Figure 4: The left side shows the steady state value p(pi) and the right side shows the steady state
value p(pi) The latter is not consistent with worker optimization.
5.2 Example 2: Multiple Equilibria
We now change the parameters so that the model admits multiple equilibria. See the appendix
for details. Note that both sectors are active in every equilibrium of the example. The first
equilibrium is a fully mixed equilibrium pi∗ ∈ (pi, pi) shown in Figure 5. Here both sectors are
active, and qualified workers are indifferent between accepting and rejecting, so α(pi∗) ∈ (0, 1) is
set to create indifference firms that enter.
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Figure 5: The bounds are pi = 0.2104, pi = 0.2368, and the equilibrium pi∗ = 0.2355. Parameters
used for this example are: β = 0.99, φ = 0.08, r = 0.75, ψ = 0.25, b = 0.2; and Wq = 1, Wu = −1,
yl = 0.5, wl = 0.495.
There are also two equilibria in which both sectors are active and workers are playing pure
strategies at pi and pi, respectively. At pi low tech jobs must be rejected by workers to keep firms
indifferent, so α(pi) = 0. The equilibrium p(pi) characterized by (29) is p(pi) = 0.7838 ∈ (0, 1) shown
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in the left side of Figure (6). And p(pi)Aq(pi) − Q
∗ = p(pi)pi(2 − pi) − Q∗ > 0 is consistent with
workers’ acceptance rule α(pi) = 0.
At pi low tech jobs must be accepted. The equilibrium p(pi) characterized by (28) is p(pi) =
0.1658 ∈ (0, 1) shown in the right side of Figure (6). And p(pi)Aq(pi)−Q
∗ = p(pi)pi(2−pi)−Q∗ < 0
is consistent with workers’ acceptance rule α(pi) = 1.
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Figure 6: The left side shows the steady state equilibrium p(pi) at pi, and the right side shows the
steady state equilibrium p(pi) at pi.
6 The Model with Observable Group Characteristics
We now add a payoff irrelevant group characteristic to the model. Each worker belongs to group
j ∈ {f,m} and we denote by λj the fraction of workers in the population that belongs to group
j. For notational brevity, we let pi =
(
pim, pif
)
denote the endogenous stationary proportions of
qualified workers from each group.
6.1 Firm Optimization
For the same reasons as in the baseline model, the values of employing qualified and unqualified
workers are independent of pi =
(
pim, pif
)
and given by Wu and Wq defined in (3). Hence, there is
no change in the optimal firm hiring decision. Given group-specific prior pij the and signal θ the
firm is better off hiring the worker from group j ∈ {f,m} in expectation if and only if
P
(
θ, pij
)
Wq +
(
1− P
(
θ, pij
))
Wu ≥ 0. (33)
Hence, the optimal hiring rule is derived just like in the symmetric model, so for any j = m, f and
any pij ∈ [0, 1] the optimal hiring threshold is characterized as in Lemma 1. We write s (pim) and
s
(
pif
)
for the thresholds as they can be determined independently. We also keep the shorthand
notation Aq
(
pij
)
= 1−Fq
(
s
(
pij
))
for the probability that a qualified worker will get an offer when
matched with a high tech firm and Au
(
pij
)
= 1− Fu
(
s
(
pij
))
for the corresponding probability for
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an unqualified worker. As in the symmetric model these are uniquely determined and
pijAq(pi
j)Wq + (1− pi
j)Au(pi
j)Wu
is strictly increasing in pij for exactly the same reasons as the baseline model.
The free entry conditions are the obvious extensions of the ones for the symmetric model,
namely
K = βpf
∑
j=f,m
λj
[
pijAq(pi
j)Wq + (1− pi
j)Au(pi
j)Wu
]
(34)
K = βpf
∑
j=f,m
λj
[
pijαj (pi) + (1− pij)
]
Wl,
where pf is the probability that a firm matches with a worker, which, since we use simple urn
ball matching, is equated with the ratio of unemployment over vacancies, or the inverse market
tightness rate. Notice that αj (pi), the randomization probability for a worker in group j is written
as a function of the proportion of qualified unemployed for both groups. This is because of feedback
effects between groups that are explained below.
The argument is identical to the argument for the symmetric model. Also, we note that a
necessary condition for existence of an equilibrium with both sectors active is∑
j=f,m
λj
[
pijαj (pi) + (1− pij)
]
Wl =
∑
j=f,m
λj
[
pijAq(pi
j)Wq + (1− pi
j)Au(pi
j)Wu
]
, (35)
generalizing the condition in (10) from the baseline model. This condition illustrates that if starting
from a mixed strategy equilibria, an increase in pij no longer needs to be accompanied by an
increased probability of accepting low tech jobs for group j to keep firm indifference, as the other
group can adjust their behavior instead. Indeed, the worker optimization problem will create
incentives for such cross groups effects to be present.
6.2 Worker Optimization
As in the symmetric model, we only need to consider the qualified workers. Denote by V j0 (pi),
V jh (pi) and V
j
l (pi) the value for a qualified worker from being unemployed, being employed in the
high tech sector, and being employed in the low tech sector, respectively. Also, let p (pi) be the
probability that the worker meets a high tech firm, so that 1− p (pi) is the probability of meeting
a low tech firm. Following the same steps (e.g.,from the obvious extensions of (13) and (14) as in
the symmetric model we have that
V jh (pi) =
wh + φβV
j
0 (pi)
1− (1− φ) β
(36)
V jl (pi) =
wl + φβV
j
0 (pi)
1− (1− φ) β
,
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and we can characterize the worker optimality condition just like in the symmetric model. Recall
that V ∗ is defined in (16) as the value of unemployment that makes the worker indifferent between
accepting and rejecting. For the same reasons as in the symmetric model we have that
αj (pi) =

1 if V j0 (pi) < V
∗
[0, 1] if V j0 (pi) = V
∗
0 if V j0 (pi) > V
∗
. (37)
By substituting into the analog of (13) it follows that if the worker is indifferent, then it must be
that
V ∗ = p (pi)Aq
(
pij
) wh + φβV ∗
1− (1− φ) β
+
(
1−Aq
(
pij
)
p (pi)
)
(b+ βV ∗) . (38)
Hence, the characterization of the optimal worker behavior is almost identical to the symmetric
model. Using the exact same steps as in the baseline model, we have that:
Lemma 5. Suppose that 0 ≤ wl − b ≤ β(1− φ)(wh − b) and let Q
∗ ∈ [0, 1] be defined in Lemma 4.
Then, the optimal worker choice correspondence for group j is,
αj (pi) =

1 if p (pi)Aq
(
pij
)
< Q∗
[0, 1] if p (pi)Aq
(
pij
)
= Q∗
0 if p (pi)Aq
(
pij
)
> Q∗
. (39)
At this point, it may appear that the two group model collapses to the baseline model, but this
isn’t so because of a subtle difference. We assume that workers from the two groups are randomly
matched with firms. Hence, both groups are faced with the same probability of matching a high
tech firm, implying that firm entry cannot adjust to keep both groups willing to randomize unless
pim = pif .
6.3 The Fragility of Mixing with Multiple Groups
In the symmetric model, should pi change slightly from a fully mixed equilibrium, an associated
small change in the proportion of high tech firms can restore indifference for the workers. In
contrast, when there are multiple groups and pij is perturbed from a symmetric mixed strategy
equilibrium, there is simply no way for the proportion of high tech firms to adjust so as to make
both groups indifferent. This is immediate from the acceptance rules in (39). It follows that the
response must involve at least one group to reject low tech offers for sure or one group to accept low
tech offers for sure. Hence, equilibria in which both groups are mixing is a knife edge possibility,
whereas mixing in the symmetric model may be a robust possibility.
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6.4 Steady State Conditions
Refer to the symmetric model and note that because the steady state conditions in terms of p, αj
and pij are just like the symmetric model, we now how a pair of steady state conditions
G(pif , αf (pi) , p (pi)) = 0 (40)
G (pim, αm (pi) , p (pi)) = 0,
where G is defined in (25). Derivations are identical to the baseline model. Hence:
Definition 2. A steady state equilibrium is an object
(
pi, αf (pi), αm(pi), p(pi)
)
such that (40) holds,(
αf (pi) , αm (pi)
)
satisfy the worker optimality condition (39) and p (pi) is consistent with optimal
entry.
It is immediate from (40) that if (pi, α (pi) , p (pi)) is an equilibrium in the baseline model,
then (pi, pi) satisfies (40). Moreover, the optimality condition (39) and firm entry conditions re-
duce to the ones in the baseline model. Hence, any equilibrium in the baseline model corre-
sponds to a non-discriminatory equilibrium in the model with observable group characteristics(
pi, αf (pi) , αm (pi) , p (pi)
)
= ((pi, pi) , α (pi) , α (pi) , p (pi)).
7 Equilibria with Discrimination
We now argue that even in the case with a unique equilibrium in the symmetric model, there may
be asymmetric equilibria in the model with observable group characteristics.
Assume that pi < Π∗ < pi is such that Aq (Π
∗) = Q∗. Since Q∗ can be set in any way we
want without affecting the incentives for the firms by simultaneously changing the wage and the
productivity this is always possible. Also assume that ψ > pi, which assures that G (pi, 1, 0) > 0.
Moreover, let φ be small enough so that any pi∗ < Π∗ for any pi∗ such that G˜ (pi∗) = 0 and so that
G (pi, 1, 1) < 0 and p (pi) < Q
∗
Aq(pi)
for the unique solution to G (pi, 1, p (pi)) = 0. This is possible as
pi∗ (φ) → 0 as φ → 0 for any sequence of solutions to G˜ (pi∗ (φ)) = 0, G (pi, 1, 1) → −∞ as φ → 0
and p (pi (φ)) → 0 as φ → 0 for any sequence of solutions to G (pi, 1, p (pi;φ)) = 0. Together these
assumptions rule out any kind of symmetric equilibrium except for a fully randomized equilibrium.
Moreover, we have that
G˜ (Π∗) = G (Π∗, α (Π∗) , 1) < 0 < G
(
pi, 1,
Q∗
Aq (pi)
)
(41)
where the first inequality is because there is no high tech equilibrium and the second because
there is no two sector equilibrium at pi. By continuity, there exists some fully mixed symmetric
equilibrium pi∗ ∈ (Π∗, pi) . In general, it may or may not be unique, but the case with uniqueness
(which is possible) is the more interesting case.
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Proposition 6. Suppose that (41) is satisfied. Then there exists a fully mixed symmetric equilib-
rium
(
pi∗, α (pi∗) , Q
∗
Aq(pi∗)
)
. Moreover, for any such symmetric equilibrium there exists an interval(
p, p
)
containing Q
∗
Aq(pi∗)
and pif (p) < pi∗ < pim (p) such that each p ∈
(
p, p
)
,
(
pif (p) , pim (p)
)
cor-
responds to an asymmetric equilibrium in which αf (p) = 1 and am (p) = 0 for some population
proportions
(
λf (p) , λm (p)
)
with λf (p) + λm (p) = 1. Moreover, if φ is small enough λm (p) is
strictly increasing in p implying that there is a generic set of population fractions such that an
asymmetric equilibrium exists.
The idea is straightforward, but some of the details of the proof in the appendix are somewhat
tedious. The first step simply notes that if the proportion of high tech firms stays the same and
women accept low tech jobs for sure and men reject them for sure, then the steady state proportions
of qualified men and females diverge. Men are now more likely to be qualified and women are less
likely to be qualified than in the randomized equilibrium. All else equal the profitability of meeting
men (women) increases (decreases) in the high tech sector and decreases (increases) in the low tech
sector, so the population proportion that leaves the firms indifferent at the original high tech firm
probability Q∗/Aq (pi
∗) are uniquely determined. However, p can be perturbed around Q∗/Aq (pi
∗)
while still having men with a strict incentive to reject low tech jobs and women having a strict
incentive to accept. This can be used to show that there is a robust set of
(
λf , λm
)
for which an
asymmetric equilibrium exists.
It is important to notice that nowhere is the proof of Proposition 6 relying on multiplicity in
the underlying one-group model. Instead, the result is driven by the fact that men and women
compete in the same market, which allows the two groups to specialize in equilibrium.5 All else
equal, if men get pickier, which increases the fraction of qualified unemployed men, the high tech
sector gets more profitable. To restore equal profits, it is thus necessary for women to get less
picky. One could, of course, object that instead the high tech sector should compete away the low
tech jobs, but this would drive down the proportion of qualified workers in both groups to such an
extent that only low tech firms would like to enter when φ is small.
7.1 Numerical Example of Discrimination
We consider the two group version of the model in Section 5.1, assuming groups are of equal size.
Recall that in the baseline model, this is a parametrization in which the equilibrium is unique. This
equilibrium corresponds to a symmetric equilibrium with two groups, but as we show below, there
are now also discriminatory equilibria, illustrating that the model creates potential incentives for
specialization.
We know from from (39) that at most group can randomize. There may be equilibria in which
no group randomizes, but we will consider the case in which pim > pif and αf (pi) ∈ (0, 1). Then,
5This is somewhat similar to Bardhi et al. (2019) where learning dynamics can create sizable inequality from small
differences between groups
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we have that αm(pi) = 0 from (39):
p (pi)Aq (pi
m) > p (pi)Aq(pi
f ) = Q∗︸ ︷︷ ︸
hiring probability of high tech firm
and αm = 0 < αf ∈ (0, 1)︸ ︷︷ ︸
acceptance of low tech job
.
This can be interpreted as a cross group effect that comes from both groups searching in the same
labor market. They therefore share the same probability of matching with a high tech firm p(pi),
which drives the spillovers across groups.
In the discriminatory equilibrium p(pi)Aq(pi
m) > Q∗ = p(pi)Aq(pi
f ) to justify the worker accep-
tance rules. Moreover, the indifference condition for two active sectors (35) evaluated at αm(pi) = 0
simplifies to
λm(1− pim)Wl + λ
f
[
pifαf (pi) + (1− pif )
]
Wl =
∑
j=f,m
λj
[
pijAq(pi
j)Wq + (1− pi
j)Au(pi
j)Wu
]
. (42)
This condition pins down the female group’s acceptance decision αf (pi) as an increasing function
in both pif and pim,
αf (pi) =
∑
j=f,m λ
j
[
pijAq(pi
j)Wq + (1− pi
j)Au(pi
j)Wu − (1− pi
j)Wl
]
λfpifWl
. (43)
The steady state conditions (40) evaluated at αm(pi) = 0 and p(pi) = Q
∗
Aq(pif )
are then
1 +
Q∗
Aq(pif )
Au(pi
m)
φ+ (1− φ)r
+
1− Q
∗
Aq(pif )
φ
=
1− ψ
1− pim
pim
ψ
[
1 +
Q∗
Aq(pif )
Aq(pi
m)
φ
]
, (44)
1 +
Q∗
Aq(pif )
Au(pi
f )
φ+ (1− φ)r
+
1− Q
∗
Aq(pif )
φ
=
1− ψ
1− pif
pif
ψ
1 + Q∗
φ
+
1− Q
∗
Aq(pif )
φ
αf (pi)
 , (45)
where αf (pi) is determined in (43). These two equations pin down the equilibrium
{
pim, pif
}
. If the
group m workers’ condition p(pi)Aq(pi
f ) = Q∗ < p(pi)Aq(pi
m) hold, then the equilibria candidate is
an equilibrium.
Substituting the parametric assumptions into equations (44) and (45) we plot the result in
Figure 7. The plot shows the discrimination equilibrium beliefs about the qualification of group f
and m. The steady state condition for male group (44) is captured by the blue line, and the steady
state condition for female group (45) is represented by the red line. The equilibrium beliefs about
the qualification of the male group and female group pim > pif , confirming that we have constructed
an equilibrium.
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Figure 7: Discrimination equilibria with pim > pif . The red line captures the steady state function
for women, the blue line captures the steady state function for men. Parameters for this example
are the same as Section 5.1: β = 0.9, φ = 0.06, r = 0.75, ψ = 0.25, b = 0.2.
In the discriminatory equilibrium, observing a signal about workers’ qualification, high tech
firms set a higher hiring threshold for the workers from group f . Hence, high tech firms offer a
job to the workers from group f with a lower probability than workers from group m. As a result,
group f workers incentives to accept low tech jobs are reinforced. One may notice that this looks
a lot like women are less self-confident than men, so our model could be viewed as an instrumental
model of effects of confidence on the gender gap studied by Kamas and Preston (2018) and others.
8 Discussion: Affirmative Action
Most applied theory papers on affirmative action are aimed at pointing out potential unintended
effects of the policy. Coate and Loury (1993) argue that the policy may need to be permanent
because incentives to acquire human capital may be perversely affected. Moro and Norman (2003)
point out that if wages are endogenous, affirmative action may not even benefit the targeted group.
Chan and Eyster (2003) show that banning affirmative action in college admissions may backfire be-
cause universities create more randomness in the admission process. Finally, Fershtman and Pavan
(2020) argue that requiring a larger proportion of minority candidates to be considered can backfire
as employers may respond by increasing the pool of candidates.
In our model, when comparing steady states before and after the policy, none of these unintended
consequences occur. Assuming that the policy mandates that the proportion of men and women
should be equalized in the high tech sector, the only possible steady state equilibrium is a symmetric
equilibrium. Should pif < pim, the only way the firms could satisfy the quota is to be less demanding
on female applicants. Hence, women would have weaker incentives to accept low tech jobs, which is
inconsistent with pif < pim. While we have not worked out the adjustment dynamics, this suggests
that gender quotas could be useful if statistical discrimination driven by occupational choice is
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important for the gender wage gap.
Our model and Coate and Loury (1993) interpret affirmative action as a relative hiring quota,
and the two models have a similar externality. In Coate and Loury (1993), the more your group
invests the higher is the prior belief about the worker, while in our case, the pickier your group is
the higher is the prior belief about the worker. So, why are the results so different? Besides our
model being a full-fledged dynamic model, the key difference is that making it easier to get the
more attractive jobs unambiguously creates the right incentives to reject low end jobs. In contrast,
Coate and Loury (1993) focuses on the possibility that making it easier to get the attractive jobs
distorts incentives for pre-market investments in human capital.
9 Conclusion
We propose a search model of statistical discrimination. The interaction between occupational
choice, search externalities, and a signal extraction problem makes it possible that identical groups
specialize in equilibrium, resulting in cross-group inequality. Groups share the same labor market,
creating spillover effects between groups, and discriminatory equilibria may exist also when the
baseline model without group characteristic has a unique equilibrium. For the same reason, it is
possible that the introduction of group characteristics destabilizes a symmetric equilibrium. Unlike
the previous literature, affirmative action is an appropriate remedy to eliminate discriminatory
equilibria in our model.
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A Appendix A: Omitted Proofs
A.1 Proof of Lemma 1
Proof. Suppose that s (pi) solves P (s (pi) , pi)Wq + (1− P (s (pi) , pi))Wu = 0, which can be rear-
ranged as (5). By the monotone likelihood property it follows that P (θ, pi)Wq+(1− P (θ, pi))Wu >
0 for θ > s (pi) and P (θ, pi)Wq+(1− P (θ, pi))Wu < 0 for θ < s (pi), so the firm has a strict incentive
to hire a worker with θ > s (pi) and a strict incentive not to hire a worker with θ < s (pi) . The
corner cases are immediate.
A.2 Proof of Lemma 2
Proof. Applying the envelope theorem to piAq(pi)Wq + (1 − pi)Au(pi)Wu = max
θ
pi [1− Fq(θ)]Wq +
(1− pi) [1− Fu(θ)]Wu, we have
d
dpi
[piAq(pi)Wq + (1− pi)Au(pi)Wu]
= [1− Fq(θ(pi))]Wq − [1− Fu(θ(pi))]Wu > 0,
where the strict inequality follows from 1− Fq(θ) > 1− Fu(θ), which is an implication of
fq
fu
being
strictly increasing in θ, and Wq > Wu.
A.3 Proof of Lemma 3
Proof. To show (1). For pi < pi,
−K + βpf [piAq(pi)Wq + (1− pi)Au(pi)Wu]
< −K + βpf [piAq(pi)Wq + (1− pi)Au(pi)Wu]
= −K + βpf (1− pi)Wl
< −K + βpf (1− pi)Wl
≤ −K + βpf [piα+ (1− pi)]Wl
where the first inequality follows from piAq(pi)Wq + (1 − pi)Au(pi)Wu is strictly increasing (in
Lemma 2), the equality follows from (1 − pi)Wl = piAq(pi)Wq + (1 − pi)Au(pi)Wu, and the last
inequality hold for any α ∈ [0, 1]. Hence, the low tech sector dominates high-tech sector for any
α ∈ [0, 1] when pi ∈ [0, pi).
To show (5). For pi > pi,
−K + βpf [piAq(pi)Wq + (1− pi)Au(pi)Wu]
> −K + βpf [piAq(pi)Wq + (1− pi)Au(pi)Wu]
= −K + βpfWl
≥ −K + βpf [piα+ (1− pi)]Wl.
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where the first inequality follows from piAq(pi)Wq + (1 − pi)Au(pi)Wu is strictly increasing (in
Lemma 2), the equality follows from Wl = piAq(pi)Wq + (1 − pi)Au(pi)Wu, the second inequality
holds for any α ∈ [0, 1]. Hence, entering the high-tech sector dominates the low tech sector for any
α ∈ [0, 1] when pi ∈ (pi, 1].
To show (2) (3) (4). The workers’ acceptance rule α matters only when two sectors are active.
When both sectors are active, the indifference condition holds
[piα (pi) + (1− pi)]Wl = piAq(pi)Wq + (1− pi)Au(pi)Wu,
from which we have a unique α(pi) =
piAq(pi)Wq+(1−pi)Au(pi)Wu−(1−pi)Wl
piWl
.
From Lemma 2, piAq(pi)Wq + (1 − pi)Au(pi)Wu is strictly increasing. It is thus immediate that
α(pi) must be strictly increasing to keep firms indifferent between the two sectors.
A.4 Proof of Lemma 4
Proof. For the first part, equation (18) is simply a linear function of Q (pi). It has solution
Q∗ =
wl−(1−(1−φ)β)b
(1−φ)β − wl
wh − wl
∈ [0, 1] ,
provided that 0 ≤ wl−b ≤ β(1−φ)(wh−b). For the second part, suppose that α (pi) = 1 is optimal.
Then, by (17) V0(pi) ≤ V
∗ and, directly from (13) Vl(pi) ≥ b+ βV0(pi). Equation (13) becomes
V0(pi) = p (pi)
[
Aq (pi)
wh + φβV0(pi)
1− (1− φ) β
+ (1−Aq (pi)) (b+ βV0(pi))
]
+ (1− p (pi))Vl (pi)
≥ p (pi)
[
Aq (pi)
wh + φβV0(pi)
1− (1− φ) β
+ (1−Aq (pi)) (b+ βV0(pi))
]
+ (1− p (pi)) (b+ βV0(pi))
= p (pi)Aq (pi)
wh + φβV0(pi)
1− (1− φ) β
+ (1−Aq (pi) p (pi)) (b+ βV0(pi))
= p (pi)Aq (pi)
[
wh + φβV0(pi)
1− (1− φ) β
− (b+ βV0(pi))
]
+ (b+ βV0(pi)) (46)
or
p (pi)Aq (pi) ≤
V0(pi)− (b+ βV0(pi))
wh+φβV0(pi)
1−(1−φ)β − (b+ βV0(pi))
,
where the RHS is increasing in V0(pi) and V0(pi) ≤ V
∗. Hence, p (pi)Aq (pi) ≤ Q
∗. A symmetric
argument shows that α (pi) = 0 is optimal if and only if p (pi)Aq (pi) ≥ Q
∗ and the derivation of
(18) shows that the worker is indifferent if and only if p (pi)Aq (pi) = Q
∗.
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A.5 Proof of Proposition 1
Proof. Suppose an equilibrium with p (pi) = 0 exists, which implies that α(pi) = 1 from (20). For
this to be consistent with the steady state conditions
G (pi, 1, 0) = 1 +
1
φ
−
1− ψ
1− pi
pi
ψ
[
1 +
1
φ
]
= 0. (47)
The unique solution to (47) is pi = ψ is the unique solution to this equation. Since p (pi) = p (ψ) = 0
it follows that p (ψ)Aq (ψ) = 0 < Q
∗ so this is an equilibrium as ψ ≤ pi.
A.6 Proof of Proposition 2
Proof. We note that G˜ is continuous, that G˜ (0) > 0, and G˜ (pi) → −∞ as pi → 1. Hence, the
steady state condition (26) has at least one solution pi∗. From Lemma 3 it is then immediate
that (pi∗, p (pi∗)) = (pi∗, 1) is inconsistent with equilibrium if pi∗ < pi. For pi∗ ∈ [pi, pi] is consistent
with equilibrium if and only if workers are willing to reject low tech offers, which is if and only if
Aq (pi
∗) ≥ Q∗. Finally, if pi∗ > pi it is direct from Lemma 3 that only high tech firms are willing to
enter regardless of what workers do.
A.7 Proof of Proposition 3
Proof.
G (pi, 1, 0) =
ψ − pi
(1− pi)ψ
[
1 +
1
φ
]
> 0 (48)
if and only if ψ > pi, and
G (pi, 1, p) = G (pi, 1, 0) + p
[
Au(pi)
φ+ (1− φ)r
−
1
φ
−
1− ψ
1− pi
pi
ψ
(
Aq(pi)
φ
−
1
φ
)]
. (49)
Hence, if ψ > pi then G (pi, 1, 0) > 0. So a unique solution to (28) exists if G (pi, 1, 1) ≤ 0, which
is possible since
Au(pi)
φ+ (1− φ)r
−
1
φ
−
1− ψ
1− pi
pi
ψ
(
Aq(pi)
φ
−
1
φ
)
<
ψ − pi
(1− pi)ψ
(
Aq(pi)
φ
−
1
φ
)
≤ 0.
If instead ψ < pi, then G (pi, 1, p) is strictly increasing in p ∈ [0, 1] since
Au(pi)
φ+ (1− φ)r
−
1
φ
−
1− ψ
1− pi
pi
ψ
(
Aq(pi)
φ
−
1
φ
)
>
ψ − pi
(1− pi)ψ
[
Au(pi)
φ+ (1− φ)r
−
1
φ
]
> 0.
But
G (pi, 1, 1) = 1 +
Au(pi)
φ+ (1− φ)r
−
1− ψ
1− pi
pi
ψ
[
1 +
Aq(pi)
φ
]
<
ψ − pi
(1 − pi)ψ
[
1 +
Aq(pi)
φ
]
< 0,
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which implies that if ψ < pi there is no solution p (pi) ∈ [0, 1] to (28) .
A.8 Proof of Proposition 5
Proof. If ψ ≤ pi a low tech equilibrium exists. Hence, consider the case in which ψ > pi. Assume
first that Aq (pi) ≤ Q
∗. Then, if G˜ (pi) = G (pi, 0, 1) = G (pi, 1, 1) ≥ 0 there exists a solution pi∗ ≥ pi to
(26) which corresponds to a high tech equilibrium (even if pi∗ = pi because Aq (pi) ≤ Q
∗). Hence, for
no high tech equilibrium to exist G˜ (pi) = G (pi, 0, 1) = G (pi, 1, 1) < 0. Since we are also assuming
ψ > pi and Aq (pi) ≤ Q
∗, Proposition 3 guarantees existence of a pure strategy equilibrium at
pi. Hence, the only possibility for non-existence is that Aq (pi) > Q
∗. Then, (assuming away the
trivial case with Aq (0) ≥ Q
∗) there exists Π∗ < pi such that Aq (Π
∗) = Q∗. Assume that Π∗ ≤ pi.
Then for no high tech equilibrium to exist G˜ (pi) = G (pi, 0, 1) < 0 as otherwise a solution pi∗
such that G˜ (pi∗) = 0 exists and corresponds to a high tech equilibrium. From (30) we know that
G (pi, 0, 0) > 0 given that ψ ≥ pi, so for no two sector equilibrium to exist at pi it must be that
p (pi)Aq (pi) < Q
∗ for the unique solution to G (pi, 0, p (pi)) = 0. Since G (pi, 0, p) in linear in p and
p (pi) < Q
∗
Aq(pi)
it follows that G
(
pi, 0, Q
∗
Aq(pi)
)
< 0. Hence, for a mixed strategy equilibrium not to
exist G
(
pi, 1, Q
∗
Aq(pi)
)
≤ 0 as solution is continuous in pi on [pi, pi] .We also have that G (pi, 1, 0) > 0 be
because ψ > pi, so, by linearity, if there is no fully mixed equilibrium there exists p (pi) ∈
(
0, Q
∗
Aq(pi)
]
such that G (pi, 1, p (pi)) = 0. Hence, we have established existence of at least one equilibrium
whenever Π∗ ≤ pi. The final possibility is that pi < Π∗ < pi. Then, for no high tech equilibrium to
exist G˜ (Π∗) = G (Π∗, α (Π∗) , 1) < 0. For the same reason as above, for no mixed equilibrium to
exist it must be that G
(
pi, 1, Q
∗
Aq(pi)
)
≤ 0. Repeating the argument above it follows that there exists
an equilibrium at pi.
A.9 Proof of Proposition 6
Proof. Consider an alternative candidate equilibrium in which αf (pi) = 1 and αm (pi) = 0. In such
an equilibrium, the following conditions must hold
G
(
pif , 1, p (pi)
)
= 1 +
p (pi)Au(pi
f )
φ+ (1− φ)r
+
1− p (pi)
φ
−
1− ψ
1− pif
pif
ψ
[
1 +
p (pi)Aq(pi
f )
φ
+
1− p (pi)
φ
]
= 0,
p (pi)Aq(pi
f ) ≤ Q∗,
G (pim, 0, p (pi)) = 1 +
p (pi)Au(pi
m)
φ+ (1− φ)r
+
1− p (pi)
φ
−
1− ψ
1− pim
pim
ψ
[
1 +
p (pi)Aq(pi
m)
φ
]
= 0,
p (pi)Aq(pi
m) ≥ Q∗.
Note that
G
(
pi∗, 1,
Q∗
Aq (pi∗)
)
−G
(
pi∗, α (pi∗) ,
Q∗
Aq (pi∗)
)
= (α (pi∗)− 1)
1− ψ
1− pi∗
pi∗
ψ
[
1− Q
∗
Aq(pi∗)
φ
]
< 0.
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Since, G
(
pi∗, α (pi∗) , Q
∗
Aq(pi∗)
)
= 0 it follows that G
(
pi∗, 1, Q
∗
Aq(pi∗)
)
< 0. Symmetrically,
G
(
pi∗, 0,
Q∗
Aq (pi∗)
)
−G
(
pi∗, α (pi∗) ,
Q∗
Aq (pi∗)
)
= α (pi∗)
1− ψ
1− pi∗
pi∗
ψ
[
1− Q
∗
Aq(pi∗)
φ
]
> 0,
so G
(
pi∗, 0, Q
∗
Aq(pi∗)
)
> 0.
Notice that G
(
0, 1, Q
∗
Aq(pi∗)
)
> 0 and limpi→1G
(
pi, 0, Q
∗
Aq(pi∗)
)
= −∞. Hence, there exists(
pif , pim
)
with pif < pi∗ < pim such that
G
(
pif , 1,
Q∗
Aq (pi∗)
)
= 0 (50)
G
(
pim, 0,
Q∗
Aq (pi∗)
)
= 0.
It is thus immediate that Aq
(
pif
)
Q∗
Aq(pi∗)
< Q∗ and Aq (pi
m) Q
∗
Aq(pi∗)
> Q∗, justifying the incentives
to accept and reject low tech jobs for the two groups. In contrast, the indifference condition for
the entrant firms is not necessarily satisfied. However,
1 > pi∗α (pi∗) + (1− pi∗)
= pi∗Aq(pi
∗)Wq + (1− pi
∗)Au(pi
∗)Wu
> pifAq(pi
f )Wq + (1− pi
f )Au(pi
f )Wu,
and
(1− pim) < 1− pi∗ < pi∗α (pi∗) + (1− pi∗)
= pi∗Aq(pi
∗)Wq + (1− pi
∗)Au(pi
∗)Wu
< pimAq(pi
m)Wq + (1− pi
m)Au(pi
m)Wu,
so there exists a unique
(
λf , λm
)
with λf + λm = 1 such that[
λf + λm (1− pim)
]
Wl = λ
f
[
pifAq(pi
f )Wq + (1− pi
f )Au(pi
f )Wu
]
+ λm [pimAq(pi
m)Wq + (1− pi
m)Au(pi
m)Wu] .
By continuity of G there is an interval
(
p, p
)
around Q
∗
Aq(pi∗)
such that pAq(pi
f ) < Q∗ and pAq(pi
m) >
Q∗ and
G (0, 1, p) > 0 > G (pi∗, 1, p)
G (pi∗, 1, p) > 0 > lim
pi→1
G (pi, 1, p)
for each p ∈
(
p, p
)
. For each p in the interval there is a corresponding solution pif (p) , pim (p)
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such that pif (p) < pi∗ < pim (p) and for each such solution there is a unique
(
λf (p) , λm (p)
)
with
λf (p)+λm (p) = 1 that makes firms indifferent across sectors. Moreover, if we pick
(
pif (p) , pim (p)
)
as always being the smallest solutions differentiability of G (pi, α, p) on (0, 1) implies that within
the interval
∂G
(
pif (p) , 1, p
)
∂pif
< 0, (51)
∂G (pim (p) , 0, p)
∂pif
< 0.
By a direct calculation
∂G (pi, α, p)
∂p
=
Au(pi)
φ+ (1− φ)r
−
1
φ
−
1− ψ
1− pi
pi
ψ
[
1 +
Aq(pi)
φ
−
α
φ
]
.
Hence, ∂G(pi
m(p),0,p)
∂p
< 0 whereas
∂G(pif (p),0,p)
∂p
is ambiguous. However, if φ is large enough we can
make sure that
∂G(pif (p),1,p)
∂p
≤ 0 for p ∈
(
p, p
)
in which case a standard implicit differentiation
implies that pif (p) and pim (p) are both decreasing in p. It then follows that for firms to keep
indifference it is necessary that λm (p) is strictly increasing in p.
B Appendix B: Numerical Examples
B.1 Description of Function (25)
We describe the G function (25) piecewisely as follows. For pi < pi, (25) evaluated at p(pi) = 0 and
α(pi) = 1
G (pi, 1, 0) = 1 +
1
φ
−
1− ψ
1− pi
pi
ψ
[
1 +
1
φ
]
. (52)
For pi > pi, p(pi) = 1, α(pi) is indetermined, (25) evaluated at p(pi) = 1
G (pi, α(pi), 1) = 1 +
Au(pi)
φ+ (1− φ)r
−
1− ψ
1− pi
pi
ψ
[
1 +
Aq(pi)
φ
]
. (53)
For pi ∈ (pi, pi), α(pi) ∈ (0, 1), p(pi) ∈ [0, 1], (25) evaluated at p(pi)Aq(pi) = Q
∗
G
(
pi, α(pi),
Q∗
Aq(pi)
)
= 1 +
Q∗
Aq(pi)
Au(pi)
φ+ (1− φ)r
+
1− Q
∗
Aq(pi)
φ
−
1− ψ
1− pi
pi
ψ
[
1 +
Q∗
Aq(pi)
Aq(pi)
φ
+
1− Q
∗
Aq(pi)
φ
α(pi)
]
,(54)
where
α(pi) =
piAq(pi)Wq + (1− pi)Au(pi)Wu − (1− pi)Wl
piWl
.
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At pi = pi, α(pi) = 0, (25) evaluated at pi and α(pi) = 0
G (pi, 0, p(pi)) = 1 +
p(pi)Au(pi)
φ+ (1− φ)r
+
1− p(pi)
φ
−
1− ψ
1− pi
pi
ψ
[
1 +
p(pi)Aq(pi)
φ
]
. (55)
At pi = pi, α(pi) = 1, (25) evaluated at pi and α(pi) = 1
G (pi, 1, p(pi)) = 1 +
p(pi)Au(pi)
φ+ (1− φ)r
+
1− p(pi)
φ
−
1− ψ
1− pi
pi
ψ
[
1 +
p(pi)Aq(pi)
φ
+
1− p(pi)
φ
]
. (56)
In sum, we simplify function (25) into a function of one dimension. For pi ∈ [0, 1] except pi and
pi, (25) is a function of pi
G0(pi) =

1 + 1
φ
− 1−ψ1−pi
pi
ψ
[
1 + 1
φ
]
if pi ∈ [0, pi)
1 +
Q∗
Aq(pi)
Au(pi)
φ+(1−φ)r +
1− Q
∗
Aq(pi)
φ
− 1−ψ1−pi
pi
ψ
[
1 +
Q∗
Aq(pi)
Aq(pi)
φ
+
1− Q
∗
Aq(pi)
φ
piAq(pi)Wq+(1−pi)Au(pi)Wu−(1−pi)Wl
piWl
]
if pi ∈ (pi, pi).
1 + Au(pi)
φ+(1−φ)r −
1−ψ
1−pi
pi
ψ
[
1 +
Aq(pi)
φ
]
if pi ∈ (pi, 1]
At pi and pi, (25) is a function of p
G1(p) =
1 +
p(pi)Au(pi)
φ+(1−φ)r +
1−p(pi)
φ
− 1−ψ1−pi
pi
ψ
[
1 +
p(pi)Aq(pi)
φ
]
if pi = pi
1 + p(pi)Au(pi)
φ+(1−φ)r +
1−p(pi)
φ
− 1−ψ1−pi
pi
ψ
[
1 +
p(pi)Aq(pi)
φ
+ 1−p(pi)
φ
]
if pi = pi.
In all the numerical examples, we use the signal distributions fq(θ) = 2θ, fu(θ) = 2(1 − θ),
which satisfy the property of monotone likelihood ratio. Calibrating Wq = 1 and Wu = −1. Then
the hiring probability for qualified and unqualified workers are Aq(pi) = pi(2− pi) and Au(pi) = pi
2,
respectively.
Proof. With Fq(θ) = θ
2, Fu(θ) = 2θ − θ
2, firms’ hiring threshold from problem 6 is
s(pi) = argmax
θ
pi
[
1− θ2
]
− (1− pi)
[
1− 2θ + θ2
]
, (57)
so s(pi) = 1− pi, and
Aq(pi) = 1− Fq(s(pi)) = 1− (1− pi)
2 = 2pi − pi2, Au(pi) = 1− Fu(s(pi)) = pi
2.
All the graphs are plotted by plugging Aq(pi) and Au(pi) into the function (25) under different
calibrated parameters.
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C External Appendix: Not Intended For Publication
C.1 Other Examples in Baseline Model
There exist other unique equilibria and multiple equilibria in the baseline model. We keep the same
parameters for Wq = 1, Wu = −1, yl = 0.5, wl = 0.495, while changing β, φ, r, ψ and b.
Other unique equilibria examples.
Unique Equilibria β φ r ψ b In Equilibrium
Example (a) .99 .15 .75 .075 .2 only low tech
Example (b) .99 .15 .75 .75 .2 only high tech
Example (c) .9 .06 .75 .25 .2 two sectors with low tech jobs rejected
Example (d) .8 .06 .75 .25 .2 two sectors with low tech job accepted
(a) With β = .99, φ = .15, r = .75, ψ = .075, b = .2, there is a unique equilibria in which only low
tech sector is active. An important change is that the mass of skilled workers is decreased
relative to the other examples. From Figure 8 we see that there exists a low tech equilibria,
and there is neither a mixed, nor a high tech equilibrium.
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Figure 8: β = 0.99, φ = 0.15, r = 0.75, ψ = 0.075, b = 0.2.
At pi = pi, solving for the steady state value p(pi) = 0.04626 ∈ [0, 1], but the worker’s
optimality for α(pi) = 0 does not hold because p(pi)Aq(pi)−Q
∗ = −0.0504 < 0. At pi = pi, the
steady state value p(pi) = 2.3693 /∈ [0, 1].
(b) With β = .99, φ = .15, r = .75, ψ = .75, b = .2, there is a unique equilibria in which only high
tech sector is active. From Figure 9 we see that there exists a high tech equilibria, and there
is neither a mixed, nor a low tech equilibrium.
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Figure 9: β = 0.99, φ = 0.15, r = 0.75, ψ = 0.75, b = 0.2.
At pi = pi, the steady state value p(pi) = 1.1242 /∈ [0, 1]. At pi = pi, the steady state value
p(pi) = 1.1290 /∈ [0, 1].
(c) With β = .9, φ = .06, r = .75, ψ = .25, b = .2, there is a unique equilibria in which both
sectors are active and the low tech jobs are rejected (accepting is not an equilibrium). This
is the case of uniqueness in the baseline model in Section 5.1.
(d) With β = .8, φ = .06, r = .75, ψ = .25, b = .2, there is a unique equilibria in which both
sectors are active and the low tech jobs are accepted (rejecting is not an equilibria). From
Figure 10 we see that there is neither a mixed, nor a high tech nor a low tech equilibrium.
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Figure 10: β = 0.8, φ = 0.06, r = 0.75, ψ = 0.25, b = 0.2.
Solving for the unique p(pi) ∈ [0, 1] that is consistent with steady state we find that under
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the parameter of the example p(pi)Aq(pi)−Q
∗ = −0.0774 < 0, so rejecting low tech offers is
inconsistent with worker optimality. At pi = pi, the steady state value p(pi) = 0.8433 ∈ [0, 1]
is consistent with workers’ accepting low tech offers as p(pi)Aq(pi)−Q
∗ = −0.0844 < 0.
Other Multiple Equilibria Examples in the baseline model.
Multiple Equilibria β φ r ψ b
Two equilibria .99 .06 .75 (.6) .25 .2 (1) two sectors with low tech
jobs rejected; (2) two sectors
with workers mixing
Three equilibria .99 .08 .75 .25 .2 (1) two sectors with low tech
jobs accepted; (2) two sectors
with workers mixing; (3) two
sectors with low tech jobs re-
jected
Three equilibria .99 .06 .75 .2 .2 (1) low tech; (2) two sectors
with workers mixing; (3) two
sectors with low tech jobs re-
jected
C.2 Single Sector Equilibria with Groups
Only low tech firms. In the case of only low tech firms p(pi) = 0, so αm(pi) = αf (pi) = 1, the
steady state functions for j = f,m are
G(pij , 1, 0) = 1 +
1
φ
−
1− ψ
1− pij
pij
ψ
[
1 +
1
φ
]
.
So pif = pim = ψ.
Moreover, firms’ entry optimality for p(pi) = 0 requires∑
j=f,m
λj
[
pijαj (pi) + (1− pij)
]
Wl ≥
∑
j=f,m
λj
[
pijAq(pi
j)Wq + (1− pi
j)Au(pi
j)Wu
]
,
degenerating into the baseline model
Wl ≥ [ψAq(ψ)Wq + (1− ψ)Au(ψ)Wu] ,
so p(pi) = 0 requires ψ ≤ pi.
Lemma 6. There is a symmetric equilibrium in which only low tech firms are active and pim =
pif = ψ if and only if ψ ≤ pi.
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Only high-tech firms. In the case of only high-tech firms p(pi) = 1, so workers’ optimality of
acceptance rule doesn’t matter. The steady state functions for j = f,m are
G(pif , αf , p(pi) = 1) = 1 +
Au(pi
f )
φ+ (1− φ)r
−
1− ψ
1− pif
pif
ψ
[
1 +
Aq(pi
f )
φ
]
= 0,
G(pim, αm, p(pi) = 1) = 1 +
Au(pi
m)
φ+ (1− φ)r
−
1− ψ
1− pim
pim
ψ
[
1 +
Aq(pi
m)
φ
]
= 0,
which pin down pim and pif . Moreover, firms’ entry optimality for p(pi) = 1 requires∑
j=f,m
λj
[
pijαj (pi) + (1− pij)
]
Wl ≤
∑
j=f,m
λj
[
pijAq(pi
j)Wq + (1− pi
j)Au(pi
j)Wu
]
,
which is easily valid because αf and αm are free if p(pi) = 0.
From the baseline analysis, we know G (pi, α, p(pi) = 1) = 1 + Au(pi)
φ+(1−φ)r −
1−ψ
1−pi
pi
ψ
[
1 +
Aq(pi)
φ
]
= 0
has at least one solution.
Lemma 7. If G (pi, α, p(pi) = 1) = 0 has a unique solution, then there is a unique symmetric
equilibrium in which only high tech firms are active and pif = pim. Otherwise, either pif = pim or
pif 6= pim.
C.3 Other Asymmetric Equilibria
Similarly, we can construct equilibria in which pim > pif , αm ∈ (0, 1), αf = 1 under some parame-
ters.
Only group m is indifferent: If αm(pi) ∈ (0, 1), then αf (pi) = 1. To make {pim > pif , αm ∈
(0, 1), αf = 1} an equilibrium, pif and pim should satisfy:
(1) Firms’ indifference condition:
λm [pimαm (pi) + (1− pim)]Wl + λ
fWl =
∑
j=f,m
λj
[
pijAq(pi
j)Wq + (1− pi
j)Au(pi
j)Wu
]
,
αm (pi) is increasing in both pif and pim.
(2) Steady state conditions: G(pim, αm(pi), p(pi)) = 0, G(pif , αf (pi) = 1, p(pi)) = 0
1 +
p (pi)Au(pi
m)
φ+ (1− φ)r
+
1− p (pi)
φ
=
1− ψ
1− pim
pim
ψ
[
1 +
p (pi)Aq(pi
m)
φ
+
(1− p (pi))αm (pi)
φ
]
1 +
p (pi)Au(pi
f )
φ+ (1− φ)r
+
1− p (pi)
φ
=
1− ψ
1− pif
pif
ψ
[
1 +
p (pi)Aq(pi
f )
φ
+
1− p (pi)
φ
]
(3) Group m workers’ indifference: Q∗ = p(pi)Aq(pi
m)
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Then, {pim, pif , αm(pi), p(pi)} are pinned down by the four equations. Substituting out p(pi) and
αm(pi), the equilibrium pim, pif are determined by
1 +
Q∗
Aq(pim)
Au(pi
m)
φ+ (1− φ)r
+
1− Q
∗
Aq(pim)
φ
=
1− ψ
1− pim
pim
ψ
[
1 +
Q∗
φ
+
1− Q
∗
Aq(pim)
φ∑
j=f,m λ
j
[
pijAq(pi
j)Wq + (1− pi
j)Au(pi
j)Wu
]
− λfWl − λ
m(1− pim)Wl
λmpimWl
]
,
1 +
Au(pi
f )
Aq(pim)
Q∗
φ+ (1− φ)r
+
1− Q
∗
Aq(pim)
φ
=
1− ψ
1− pif
pif
ψ
[
1 +
Q∗
Aq(pim)
Aq(pi
f )
φ
+
1− Q
∗
Aq(pim)
φ
]
.
Lastly, check the group f workers’ conditions: p(pi)Aq(pi
f ) < Q∗. Let m = min p(pi)Aq(pi
f ) subject
to pif , pim are solutions to the above two equations. Then if m < Q∗ there exists some equilibrium
in which group m workers are indifferent and group f workers reject the low tech job offers.
Neither group is indifferent. There are four cases: {αm = 0, αf = 1}, {αm = 1, αf = 0},
{αm = 1, αf = 1}, {αm = 0, αf = 0}.
With pim > pif , the only interesting one is: {αm = 0, αf = 1}. To make {pim > pif , αm =
0, αf = 1} be an equilibrium, it should satisfy
(1) Firms’ indifference:
λm(1− pim)Wl + λ
fWl =
∑
j=f,m
λj
[
pijAq(pi
j)Wq + (1− pi
j)Au(pi
j)Wu
]
(2) Steady state condition: G(pim, αm(pi) = 0, p(pi))) = 0, G(pif , αf (pi) = 1, p(pi))) = 0
1 +
p (pi)Au(pi
m)
φ+ (1− φ)r
+
1− p (pi)
φ
=
1− ψ
1− pim
pim
ψ
[
1 +
p (pi)Aq(pi
m)
φ
]
1 +
p (pi)Au(pi
f )
φ+ (1− φ)r
+
1− p (pi)
φ
=
1− ψ
1− pif
pif
ψ
[
1 +
p (pi)Aq(pi
f )
φ
+
1− p (pi)
φ
]
.
Then {pim, pif , p(pi)} are pinned down by the three equations, and the workers’ conditions hold:
p(pi)Aq(pi
f ) ≤ Q∗ ≤ p(pi)Aq(pi
m).
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